Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. [2] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.
Introduction
A Nash-Cournot game is a game-theoretical framework of imperfect competition in which multiple producers/players compete to optimize their individual objective functions, which also depend on other players' production decisions. Traditional (i.e., purely continuous) Nash-Cournot problems have been extensively studied and it is well known that they can be expressed either as nonlinear complementarity or variational inequality problems [1] . Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot (DC-NC) games arise when a subset of a player's decisions are required to be discrete, for example, when a player must make a binary on/off decision. Gabriel et al. [2] approached discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games by framing the problem as a discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem (DC-MCP).
We consider the same set up and, to the extent possible, the same notation as Gabriel et al. [2] . There are N players indexed by p ∈ P = {1, . . . , N }. Player p optimizes her cost function f p : R n → R that depends on her decision vector x p ∈ R np and the vector x −p = (x 1 , . . . , x p−1 , x p+1 , . . . , x N ) denoting the decisions of all other players besides player p. Here, n = p∈P n p . Specifically, we assume that player p solves the following discretely-constrained optimization problem parameterized by x −p :
where I p , E p , and D p denote the set of inequalities, equalities, and integer variables for player p ∈ P. Let X p = {x p ∈ R np : (1b), (1c), (1d), (1e)} denote the discretely-constrained feasible region for player p ∈ P and let C p = {x p ∈ R np : (1b), (1c), (1d)} denote the continuous relaxation of X p . A vectorx is called a Nash equilibrium of this DC-NC game ifx p ∈ X p for all p ∈ P and
Gabriel et al. [2] approach convex DC-NC games, i.e., games in which the continuous relaxation of each player's optimization problem is a convex optimization problem, by applying the following four-step procedure: 1) relax the integrality constraints for each player; 2) write the KKT conditions for each player; 3) re-impose the integrality constraints; 4) solve the resulting DC-MCP. More concretely, since KKT conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a discrete optimization problem, Gabriel et al. [2] attempt to find the set of Nash equilibria to (2) by appealing to the continuous relaxation of each player's parametric optimization problem:
Assume that the functions f p (·, x −p ) are convex and a constraint qualification for the continuous relaxation C p holds. Then, the KKT conditions for player p's relaxed problem (3) are to find
Gabriel et al. [2] (p.313) then write:
"An interesting question is whether the set of x p that solves (4), but with the discrete restrictions for x pr ∈ Z + for r ∈ D p , corresponds to the solution set of the original problem (2) . The next result shows that this correspondence is correct."
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3 in [2] ) Let S DC-Nash be the set of solutions to the discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game (2) and S DC-MCP be the set of solutions to (4) for which x pr ∈ Z + for r ∈ D p . Then, S DC-Nash = S DC-MCP .
Counterexamples
We now provide two simple discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot duopoly games (i.e., P = {1, 2}) for which one or more equilibria exist to (2) , but the complementarity conditions coupled with integrality restrictions are either 1) empty, or 2) non-empty, but a strict subset of the true set of equilibria. In both examples, because each player controls a single decision variable, we index player p's decision variable as x p rather than x p1 .
"Linear" players with weak continuous relaxations
Consider the simple Nash-Cournot duopoly game with the following symmetric payoff matrix:
Here each player can take a discrete (binary) action with the unique equilibrium being x 1 = x 2 = 1, i.e., each player chooses action 1 for a (minimum) payoff of -2, which is obviously a dominant strategy for each player. We now translate this DC-NC game into an optimization framework. Suppose player p ∈ {1, 2} solves the following problem:
where ǫ > 0 and Z is the set of integers. The corresponding KKT optimality conditions are
We now plug in the unique equilibrium solution x 1 = x 2 = 1. Complementarity conditions (6a) imply that λ p = 1, while conditions (6b) imply that λ p = 0. This contradiction reveals that the unique equilibrium solution
"Quadratic" players with tight continuous relaxations
In this example, the continuous relaxation for each player is tight. Consider the payoff matrix x 2 = 0 x 2 = 1 x 1 = 0 (0, 0) (9, 9)
For δ > −3, there are two equilibria in pure strategies: (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) and (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 1). This corresponds to player 1 solving the following convex quadratic problem (as a function of x 2 ):
Meanwhile, player 2 solves a similar convex quadratic problem (as a function of x 1 ):
Note that f p (·, x −p ) are convex functions and a constraint qualification holds. The KKT conditions (4) become
It is straightforward to verify that x p = λ p = 0 for all p satisfy the complementarity conditions (9). The situation is different for (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 1). Condition (9a) implies that λ 1 = 4, while condition (9c) implies that λ p ≥ 0 for all p. However, condition (9b) implies that λ 2 = −6 + δ. Thus, for δ ∈ (−3, 6), the complementarity approach fails to recognize (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 1) as an equilibrium. It it tempting to argue that when δ ∈ (−3, 1], this omission is not a concern because (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) is the preferred equilibrium (i.e., the global minimizer for both players). However, for δ > 1, player 2's global minimizer is (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 1) with a payoff of 1−δ and, for δ ∈ (1, 6), the complementarity approach does not "see" this solution as an equilibrium. In short, this example shows that, not only can the complementarity approach fail to find all equilibria to a DC-NC game, it is not guaranteed to find global optima for each player when it does return an equilibrium.
Note that one can obtain a similar result (counterexample) by replacing the L2 term (2x 1 − 3x 2 ) 2 with the L1 term |2x 1 −3x 2 | so that each player solves a linear optimization problem instead of a convex quadratic one.
Resolution
For completeness, the correct version of Theorem 3 in Gabriel et al. is
Theorem 2 Let S DC-Nash be the set of solutions to the discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game (2) and S DC-MCP be the set of solutions to (4) for which x pr ∈ Z + for r ∈ D p . Then, S DC-MCP ⊆ S DC-Nash and there exist cases when S DC-MCP S DC-Nash .
Finally, note that the heuristic proposed by Gabriel et al. to solve the DC-NC game (2) is still valid.
